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bACkGROuND
China’s	 rise,	 unresolved	 maritime	
disputes	in	Asia	Pacific,	and	the	US	pivot	to	
Asia	 have	 led	 to	 the	 re-emergence	 of	Asia-




International	 Strategic	 and	 Security	 Studies	
Programme	(ISSSP)	of	the	National	Institute	
of	Advanced	Studies	(NIAS),	Bangalore	has	
been	 engaged	 in	 a	 medium	 term	 project	
focusing	 on	 China.	 A	 primary	 objective	 of	
this	 project	 was	 to	 study	 the	 behaviour	 of	
regional	 countries	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 crisis	 in	
the	Asia	Pacific.	As	a	part	of	this	effort,	ISSSP	
organised	 a	 workshop	 titled	 ‘Asia-Pacific	
Power	Dynamics:	Strategic	Implications	and	
Options for India’ on March 11, 2014. 
Workshop Agenda & 
Methodology Validation
The agenda and the proceedings of the 
workshop	were	finalised	through	a	number	
of	 stages.	 The	 first	 stage	 involved	 in-house	
discussions	 over	 potential	 trigger	 events	
that	 could	 spur	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific.	
The	second	stage	involved	the	identification	
of crisis events and possible scenarios along 
with	 the	 compilation	 of	 a	 database,	 which	
included	 relevant	 information	 of	 all	 the	
countries	 in	 the	 region.	 Finally,	 the	 agenda	
and	 programme	 for	 the	 workshop	 were	
decided	upon	through	a	validation	exercise,	





suggested	 that	 the	 workshop	 be	 preceded	
by	 a	 seminar	 where	 subject	 experts	 would	
reinforce	the	current	baseline	positions	of	the	
various	countries	of	the	region.
kEY EvENTS FOR CRISIS SIMuLATION 
& ESCALATION




the initial baseline position.
Event 1 (Baseline position for the 
workshop)
Event I consists of ten tensions, which 
act	as	a	catalyst	to	the	ensuing	crisis.




3.	 Tensions	 continue	 in	 the	 South	 China	
Sea;
4. China enables the activation of the third 
Island Chain;
5. China’s Strategic Missile Forces are 
placed at high alert;
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7.	 The	US	Air	Sea	Battle	Doctrine	is	under	
implementation;
8.	 US	 Anti-Ballistic	 Missile	 batteries	
available	 with	 key	 countries	 in	 the	
region;
9.	 India’s	Strategic	Force	Posture	in	place;
10.	 The	 Dalai	 Lama	 factor	 becomes	 more	
important	in	relations	with	China.
Event 2
The	US	 selectively	 abrogates	 the	Cairo	
Declaration	of	1943,	the	Potsdam	Declaration	
of 1945, and the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, 






China initiates border actions in the 
Tawang	 Sector	 of	 India’s	 Northeastern	
region. 
ThE GROuPS





There	 was	 a	 fifth	 group,	 the	 Control,	 which	
included	 all	 the	 other	 countries,	 coordinated	





The Workshop revealed the following 
strands	 of	 strategic	 thinking	 amongst	 the	
different	groups:
The US
The	 workshop	 commenced	 with	 a	
baseline	 position	 wherein	 the	 US	 did	 not	
want	 to	 confront	 China	 but	 only	 deter	 it.	
However,	 the	workshop	 exercise	 suggested	
that	 if	 the	current	 tensions	transform	into	a	
crisis	that	could	escalate	into	a	confrontation,	





by its assertive actions in the region.
•	 As	events	progressed	in	the	workshop,	
America’s	 stand	 transformed	 from	
deterrence	 to	 containment	 and	
eventually	from	containment	to	possible	
confrontation with China.
•	 The	 responses	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	
US	looks	at	the	region	as	an	integrated	
entity.	 Specifically,	 the	 US	 clubbed	 the	
East	 China	 and	 the	 South	 China	 Seas,	
and the Indian Ocean region as one 
domain,	 when	 dealing	 with	 China.	
Thereby,	it	hoped	to	invoke	a	multilateral	
response to the China threat. This was 
achieved by a strengthening of ties with 
its	current	regional	allies	(Japan,	Korea),	
and	 seeking	 more	 allies	 in	 the	 South	
China	 Sea	 (Vietnam)	 and	 the	 Indian	
Ocean	Region	(India).	
•	 Although	the	US	wanted	India	to	be	a	part	of	




Asia	 Pacific	 region	 as	 an	 integrated	
entity.	 Whether	 this	 was	 a	 conscious	
part of its strategy or whether it was 
an	 inherent	flaw	in	 the	way	they	 think	
remained	unclear.
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•	 China’s	treatment	of	regional	and	global	
issues	 seemed	 to	 reveal	 an	 absence	
of	 a	 clear	 link	 between	 them.	 Though	
Taiwan, the East China Sea and the 
South	China	Sea	issues	are	all	connected	
especially	 through	 geography,	 China	
chose	to	deal	with	them	separately.
•	 The	divide	and	rule	approach	adopted	by	
China was also revealed in its preferences 
for	 bilateral	 negotiations	 even	 though	
many	 of	 the	 maritime	 disputes	 in	 the	
region	are	multilateral	ones.
•	 China’s	 strengthening	 of	 its	 military	
and	 political	 partnerships	 with	 South	
Asian	countries	like	Pakistan,	Nepal,	Sri	
Lanka,	 and	 Bangladesh	were	 aimed	 to	
check	India,	which	Beijing	identified	as	
a	crucial	US	ally.	
•	 China’s responses highlighted its 
aspirations	to	attain	parity	with	the	US	
in a new bipolar world order, where it 
enjoys	 the	 same	 status	 and	power	 that	
the	erstwhile	USSR	commanded	during	
the Cold War Era.
ASEAN
•	 ASEAN’s	 responses	 to	 the	 events	
reflected	the	lack	of	unanimity	amongst	
its	member	countries.	
•	 During	 crisis	 situations,	 ASEAN	
preferred	to	use	diplomatic	negotiations	
to	 defuse	 tensions.	 The	 workshop	
reflected	 that	 ASEAN	 is	 interested	 in	
an	enhanced	US	presence	in	the	region	
that	 allows	 its	 members	 the	 luxury	 to	
trade	with	China,	without	the	problem	
of	political	domination	by	China.
•	 Though	 ASEAN	 seemed	 comfortable	
with	 the	 current	 power	 structure	 in	
the	 region,	 an	 unleashing	 of	 Japanese	
power	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 a	 matter	
of	 grave	 concern	 to	 them.	 The	 group’s	
responses	established	that	ASEAN	was	
as	concerned	about	Japan	as	it	was	about	
China.	 This	 is	 understandable	 since	
many	 of	 the	 member	 countries	 have	
been	victims	of	 Japanese	 aggression	 in	
the past. 
•	 Looking at the overall scenario, it can be 
inferred	that	ASEAN’s	ability	to	respond	
in	 an	 affirmative	 manner	 remains	
restricted	 to	 diplomatic	 endeavours.	
Though	individual	members	of	ASEAN	
such	as	Vietnam	or	Cambodia	could	be	
important	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	
US	or	China,	the	ASEAN	collective	did	
not	seem	to	be	a	major	force	 in	a	crisis	
escalation scenario in the region. 
INDIA
•	 Throughout	 the	 crisis,	 India	 practiced	
strategic	 restraint	 and	 made	 conscious	
attempts	to	stay	out	of	a	China-US	conflict.





military	 action	was	when	 its	 territorial	
interests were in peril.
ISSuES & QuESTIONS
The	workshop	raised	a	number	of	issues	
to be addressed in greater detail. These 
issues	 arise	 from	 the	 various	 assumptions	
that	went	into	the	formulation	of	the	baseline	
positions, the trigger event for the crisis and 
other events that lead to crisis escalation.
•	 Under	what	circumstances	(that	threaten	
its	 current	 dominant	 position)	will	 the	
US	move	from	a	strategy	of	deterrence	
or	containment	of	China	towards	a	more	
aggressive	 posture	 of	 reasserting	 its	
dominance?
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•	 Is	 China’s	 current	 aggressive	 posture,	
which	 has	 transformed	 a	 number	
of	 neutral	 countries	 into	 potential	
adversaries, a part of a broader grand 






•	 Do China’s actions in the region display 
a	 prioritisation	 of	 its	 interests?	 Would	
it	 help	 if	 China	 asserted	 its	 maritime	




•	 Is	 the	 US	 approach	 of	 looking	 at	 the	
region as an integrated whole the right 
way	to	look	at	the	problem?
•	 Why	 does	 China	 continue	 to	 breach	
the	 provisions	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),	even	though	it	is	a	signatory	




•	 Under	 what	 conditions	 will	 India	 play	 a	
more	proactive	role	in	an	Asia-Pacific	crisis?
For	 the	 Indian	 strategic	 community,	
there	is	an	undoubted	need	to	gain	a	deeper	
understanding	 of	 the	 evolving	 regional	
dynamics	 of	 the	Asia-Pacific,	 as	 a	 result	 of	
China’s	rise.	ISSSP	intends	to	conduct	a	series	
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2.1 ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF 
WORkShOP
The	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 shifted	 the	
centre	of	power	towards	Asia.	This	view	was	
validated	by	 the	economic	 revival	of	China	





the	 implications	 of	 these	 developments,	 a	
shift	 in	 strategic	 focus	 towards	 a	 broader	
theatre	of	the	Indo-Pacific,	is	needed.
Though	 all	 the	 countries	 of	 this	
region	 have	 welcomed	 and	 benefited	 from	
China’s	 economic	 rise,	 increasing	 Chinese	
belligerence	in	the	South	China	Sea	and	the	
East	China	Sea	have	become	a	major	 cause	
of	 concern.	 The	 US	 pivot	 to	 Asia	 and	 the	
strengthening of its alliances in the region 




•	 How will increasing Chinese 
assertiveness,	 especially	 in	 the	 South	
China	Sea,	 affect	 the	 relations	between	
the	countries	of	the	region?
•	 How	 much	 of	 a	 threat	 is	 the	 Chinese	
presence	in	the	Indian	Ocean	for	India?
•	 Will China’s close relations with the 
littoral	 states	 of	 the	 region	 transform	









Institute	 of	 Advanced	 Studies	 (NIAS),	 as	
a	 part	 of	 its	 China	 focus	 is	 engaged	 in	 a	
medium	 term	 effort	 at	 trying	 to	model	 the	
emerging	 power	 dynamics	 of	 what	 can	 be	
loosely	described	as	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	
A	 database	 on	 all	 relevant	 countries	 in	 the	





that	 use	 a	 network	 approach	 to	 study	 the	
political,	economic,	and	military	dimensions	
of the relations between regional powers 
and	the	external	major	powers	of	the	current	
world order.
The	 idea	 of	 a	 workshop	 came	 about	
from	 the	 realisation	 that	 new	 approaches	
for	 making	 inferences	 about	 the	 strategies	
of	 countries	 had	 to	 be	 combined	 with	 the	
emerging	power	dynamics	of	the	Asia-Pacific.	
This	 would	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	
current	events	and	what	is	likely	to	happen.	
Such	a	workshop	would	help	build	national	
capacities for strategic thinking.
A	 strategic	 workshop	 was	 organised	
by	 ISSSP	 in	 Bangalore	 on	 March	 11,	 2014.	
The	 workshop	 brought	 together	 scholars,	
experts	 and	 analysts	 to	 deliberate	 on	 the	
2. bACkGROuND AND RATIONALE
6
ASIA-PAcIfIc Power DynAmIcS: StrAtegIc ImPlIcAtIonS AnD oPtIonS for InDIA
NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
current	 relations	 between	 the	 countries	 of	
the	Asia-Pacific	region.	It	also	delved	on	how	
these	relations	would	play	out	in	case	of	an	
escalating crisis in the region.
2.2 ThE ObjECTIvES OF ThE 
WORkShOP
Over	 a	 year,	 a	 number	 of	 discussions	
were	held	at	NIAS	regarding	 the	objectives	
of	the	workshop.	These	included	discussions	
with	 personnel	 from	 the	 defence	 services,	
diplomats,	 academicians	 as	 well	 as	 others	
connected	 with	 policy	 making	 within	 the	
national	security	establishment.
After	 extensive	 discussions,	 the	 major	
objectives	 of	 the	workshop	were	 identified.	
These	were	as	follows:
•	 To	examine	and	evaluate	each	country’s	
external	 and	 internal	 relationship	
structures	 to	 gain	 an	understanding	of	
the	 critical	 factors	 that	 influence	 their	
decision	making.
•	 To	understand	how	the	countries	of	the	





•	 To	 examine	 the	 dynamics	 of	 crisis	
escalation	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	and	
in	 the	 process,	 examine	 the	 interplay	
and	 trade-offs	 between	 the	 political	
and	military	actions,	as	well	as	the	risks	
of	 escalation	 from	 a	 conventional	 to	 a	
nuclear	confrontation.
•	 Use	this	understanding	of	the	behaviour	
of	 various	 countries	 to	 analyse	
their	 implications	 and	 the	 resultant	
imperatives	for	India.
•	 A	 consensus	 emerged	 from	 these	
discussions	 that	 the	 workshop	 should	
promote	 strategic	 thinking	 within	 the	
higher levels of the Indian national 
security	establishments.
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The	first	step	before	looking	at	the	design	
of	 the	 workshop	 was	 to	 build	 a	 database	
for	 countries	 of	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region.	 A	
relevant	 picture	 of	 each	 country’s	 internal	
and	 external	 situation,	 its	 vulnerabilities,	
and	the	political,	economic,	and	military	ties	
were	 created	 by	 using	 publically	 available	
data.	The	 comprehensive	 ‘knowledge	bank’	
or	database	contains	basic	information	on	the	
countries	 of	 interest	 such	 as	 ethnic	 profile,	
national	interest	of	a	country,	decision	making	
apparatus,	 military	 capabilities,	 political	
priorities,	 economic	 interests,	 and	 security	
perspectives. These networks of political, 
economic,	 and	 military	 ties	 along	 with	 an	
assessment	 of	 a	 country’s	 vulnerabilities	
provided a base for looking at the design of 
the workshop.












thinkers	 and	 decision-makers	 to	 analyse	
implications	of	 various	 courses	 of	 action	 in	
a	holistic	and	comprehensive	way.	The	focus	
therefore,	shifted	towards	identifying	a	set	of	
events that led to the creation and potential 
escalation	of	a	crisis,	based	upon	the	probable	
actions	and	reactions	of	the	countries.
There	 was	 also	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	
following:
•	 The	 theatre	 of	 interest	 would	 be	 the	
Asia-Pacific.
•	 China’s increasingly aggressive 
behaviour	 in	 the	 maritime	 domain	 of	
the	Asia-Pacific	was	identified	as	a	major	
seed to the crisis.
•	 Since	the	East	China	Sea	and	the	South	





was	 felt	 to	 include	 events	 that	 compel	
India	 to	 become	 a	 more	 proactive	
player.		Such	a	ploy	would	force	Indian	
strategic	 thinkers	 to	 look	 into	the	 issue	
and identify India’s national interests 
in	 a	more	 focused	way.	 This	was	 seen	
as	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	
workshop.
3.1 Identifying Key Events 
for the Crisis Escalation 
Scenario
A	 number	 of	 discussions	 were	 held	
on	 possible	 sequence	 of	 events	 that	 would	
trigger	 off	 the	 crisis	 and	 then	 allow	 it	 to	
escalate. There were also heated debates on 
ways	and	means	to	make	India	a	more	active	
player	in	the	various	scenarios	that	emerged.
3. ThE DESIGN OF ThE WORkShOP
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the	 US	 and	 China	 were	 directly	 involved	




of	 India-China	 engagements	 such	 as	 the	
border	 issues,	 Tibet	 and	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	
factor	 had	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 larger	 US-
China	 problem,	 which	would	 affect	 all	 the	
countries	in	the	region.
These constraints provided a reasonable 





which	 would	 engage	 the	 countries	 of	 the	
Asia-Pacific.
i. Ten	 underlying	 tensions	 governing	
the	behaviour	of	 countries	 in	 the	Asia-
Pacific.
ii. The	US	 selectively	 abrogates	 the	Cairo	
Declaration	 of	 1943,	 the	 Potsdam	
Declaration of 1945 and the San Francisco 
Treaty	of	1951.	This	unleashes	Japanese	




iv. Border	 actions	 triggered	 by	 China,	 in	
the	Northern	and	North-eastern	sectors	
of India’s border with China.
3.2 IDENTIFICATION OF kEY 
COuNTRIES
While geography and regions are no 
doubt	 important	 for	 studying	 the	 relations	
between	 countries,	 there	 are	 problems	 that	
it poses when looking at power, trade, and 
dependency	 relations	 between	 countries	 in	






major	 powers	 like	 the	 US.	 Additionally,	 it	
does	 not	 include	 a	 country	 like	 Australia,	
which	 is	 playing	 an	 important	 role	 in	
determining	 the	security	architecture	of	 the	
Asia-Pacific.
While	 all	 the	 countries	 are	 important,	
including	 all	 of	 them	 as	 individual	 and	
separate	players	may	not	be	needed.	The	US	
and	China	needed	to	be	included	as	separate	





during	 the	 workshop	 preparation,	 opinion	
was	divided	as	to	whether	ASEAN	should	be	
included	as	 a	 single	 entity	 or	 as	 individual	
member	 countries	 (at	 least	 some	 important	
countries,	 such	 as:	 Indonesia,	 Philippines,	
Vietnam,	Thailand,	Malaysia	and	Singapore).	
Based	 on	 an	 assessment	 of	 China’s	
vulnerabilities,	 Indo-China	 and	 the	 Korean	
peninsula	also	came	up	as	areas	of	concern.	








carried	 out	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 there	was	 an	
agreement	that	the	number	of	players	should	
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be	 reduced	 by	 grouping	 countries,	 whose	




The	 final	 composition	 of	 the	 various	
groups	 that	 took	 part	 in	 the	 simulation	
exercise	is	shown	below:	
Group 1	 included	 the	US	 and	 its	 allies	
in	 the	region	comprising	Japan,	Philippines	
and	South	Korea.




Group 4 was India.
Group 5	 was	 the	 Control	 Group	
responsible for coordinating and controlling 
the	 sequence	 of	 actions	 and	 reactions	
emanating	from	the	various	groups,	as	they	
respond	 to	 the	 various	 events	 creating	 and	
escalating the crisis. It also represented and 
gave	 inputs	 for	 the	 countries	 that	were	not	
included	in	any	of	the	other	groups.	
3.4 DESIGN vALIDATION
In	 order	 to	 validate	 the	 assumptions	
behind	the	sequence	of	events	and	the	crisis	
escalation	 scenario,	 a	 special	 meeting	 was	
held	with	a	group	of	identified	experts.	This	
meeting	 took	 place	 at	 NIAS,	 Bangalore	 on	
August	20,	2013.	
The	 discussions	 revealed	 that	 in	 order	
to	 facilitate	 the	 learning	 from	 the	 exercise,	
there	was	a	need	to	question	the	assumptions	
behind	each	of	the	four	events	that	constituted	
the crisis escalation scenario, so that they can 
be	better	 related	 to	 the	 realities	of	 today.	For	
doing	 this	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way,	 a	 baseline	
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4.1 WORkShOP PARTICIPANTS & 
GROuPS
The	 participants	 were	 selected	 from	
various	 fields,	 including	 the	 Foreign	 and	
Defence	 Services,	 and	 Academicians.	 They	
were	 briefed	 with	 preliminary	 information	
about	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 exercise,	 the	
scenario,	and	other	relevant	information.
Four	groups	were	formed	and	they	were	
allotted	 different	 rooms	 with	 a	 structured	
agenda	 and	 events.	 Among	 the	 members	
of	 the	 group,	 one	 was	 designated	 as	 the	
spokesperson.
As	 the	 exercise	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	
simulate	 the	 decisions	 and	 processes,	 each	
group	was	required	to	act	and	decide	what	
the	 real-world	 consequences	 could	 be	 and	
react accordingly. This hypothetical scenario 
was	set	in	the	period	2018-2020.
Since	the	game	consisted	of	four	events,	
the participants developed political and 
military	 directives	 for	 each	 of	 them.	 Each	
group	 responded	 to	 the	 supplied	 events.	
The	 resultant	 actions	 were	 then	 presented	
to	Control	for	documentation.	At	the	end	of	
the	 exercise,	 all	 the	participants	 along	with	
Control	assembled	together	for	deliberations	
on the last event and also on the key decisions 
that	were	made	by	the	groups.
The	 compositions	 of	 the	 groups	 are	 as	
follows:	
Control Panel:	 The	 Control	 Panel	
was	 headed	 by	 Vice	Admiral	 (Retd.)	 Vijay	
Shankar.	 The	 other	members	 of	 the	 control	
panel were Prof. S Chandrashekar, Prof. 
Rajaram	Nagappa,	Ms.	Aditi	Malhotra,	Ms.	
Rinita	Chowdhury	and	Dr.	M.	Mayilvaganan.	
The	main	 task	 of	 the	 Control	 Panel	was	 to	
coordinate	and	control	the	sequence	of	actions	
and	 reactions	 emanating	 from	 the	 various	
groups	(the	US,	China,	ASEAN	and	India)	as	
they	respond	to	 the	various	events	creating	
and escalating the crisis. The Control Panel 
also	represented	the	countries	that	were	not	
present	in	any	of	the	other	groups.	On	some	
occasions,	 the	 Controller	 provided	 specific	
issues	or/and	triggering	events	to	particular	
groups.	The	responses	of	the	groups	to	each	
event were recorded by the control panel, in 
a response sheet.
Team I: China and its Allies (North	
Korea	+Cambodia+	Pakistan)
Members	 of	 this	 group	 were	 Amb.	
Ranganathan	 (Spokesperson),	Mr.	 Jayadeva	
Ranade,	 Prof.	 Srikanth	 Kondapalli,	 Brig.	
Arun	Sehgal,	and	Mr.	Umakantha.
Team II: USA and its Allies	 (Japan+	
South	Korea+	Philippines)
Members	of	this	group	were	Rear	Admiral	




Team III: ASEAN 
Members	of	this	group	were	Amb.	Leela	
Ponappa	 (Spokesperson),	 Prof.	 Gopal,	 Mr.	
4. WORkShOP PROCEEDINGS
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Viswesh	Rammohan,	Ms.	Sadhavi	Chauhan,	
and	Mr.	Azhar	Khan.
Team IV: India 
Members	 of	 this	 group	 were	 Amb.	
Bhadrakumar	 (Spokesperson),	 Prof.	 S	
D	 Muni,	 Gen.	 Nagaraj,	 and	 Mr.	 Sanket	
Kulkarni.
The	 responses	 of	 the	 groups	 to	 the	
events and an analysis of these responses 
are provided in the following section. 
Critical	 questions	 regarding	 the	 various	
assumptions	 that	 went	 into	 the	 design	 of	
the crisis escalation scenario are also raised 
as a part of the analysis. They provide the 
basis	for	a	more	nuanced	assessment	of	 the	
likely	behaviour	of	various	countries	from	an	
Indian point of view.
4.2 EvENTS AND RESPONSES
EVENT I AND RESPONSES
Objective of the Event: The objective 
of	 the	event	was	 to	move	from	the	baseline	






move	 away	 from	 the	 baseline	 (deterrence)	
towards	 containment.	 The	 event	 indicated	
a transition phase that evolved based on 
the	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 US	 and	 China,	 in	
response to the projected ten hypothetical 
tensions. 
Description of the Event: The projected 
ten	hypothetical	tensions	are:




4. China	 enabling	 third	 Island	 Chain-	
China’s third island chain is a strategy 
to	 provide	 security	 to	 its	 energy	 and	
trade	routes.	The	third	island	chain	runs	
an	arc	 from	 the	north	of	 Japan,	 east	of	
the	 Mariana	 Trench	 passing	 through	
the	 Makkasar	 and	 the	 Lombok	 Straits	
extending	to	the	Chagos	archipelago.
5. China’s Strategic Missile Force placed 
on high alert.
6. Anti-Access	(A2)	and	Area	Denial	(AD)	






capabilities	 include	 advanced	 counter-
maritime	 and	 counter-air	 systems	 that	
can	destroy	 critical	mobile	 assets,	 such	
as	 surface	 ships	 and	 aircraft.	 A2/AD	
also	 extends	 into	 the	 space	 and	 cyber	
domains	 that	 support	 U.S.	 operations,	
and	 is	 specifically	 designed	 to	 disrupt	
U.S.	power	projection	and	is	well	suited	
for	use	against	U.S.	 forces	 in	 the	event	
of a confrontation over the defence of 
Taiwan.
7. US	 Air	 Sea	 Battle	 Doctrine	 –	 Air	 Sea	
Battle,	which	became	official	in	February	
2010,	 is	 an	 integrated	 battle	 doctrine	
that	 forms	 a	 key	 component	 of	 the	
military	 strategy	 of	 the	 United	 States.	
As	 explained	 by	 the	 U.S.	 Department	
of	 Defense’s	 Quadrennial	 Defense	
Review	 stated,	 “The	 Air	 Force	 and	




equipped	 with	 sophisticated	 anti-
access and area denial capabilities. The 
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concept will address how air and naval 
forces will integrate capabilities across 
all	operational	domains—air,	sea,	 land,	
space,	 and	 cyberspace—to	 counter	
growing	 challenges	 to	U.S.	 freedom	of	
action.	As	 it	 matures,	 the	 concept	will	
also	 help	 guide	 the	 development	 of	
future	 capabilities	 needed	 for	 effective	
power projection operations.” 
8. The	 US	Anti-Ballistic	Missile	 batteries-	
The	US	ABM	program	has	matured	and	
batteries	have	been	established	in	South	
Korea,	 Japan,	 Philippines,	 Taiwan,	
Vietnam	and	their	Pacific	possessions.
9. India’s	 Strategic	 Force	 Posture–CCS	





10. The	 Dalai	 Lama	 factor-	 The	 Dalai	
Lama	 factor	 was	 brought	 in	 to	 make	





Tensions 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 connect an 
overtly	 aggressive	 China	 with	 a	 more	
aggressive	 strategic	 force	 posture.	 This	
posture	 included	 activation	 of	 the	 Third	
Island	Chain,	 placement	 of	Chinese	missile	





Tensions 2, 7 and 8 indicate the 
willingness	of	 the	US	to	respond	to	China’s	
increasingly	aggressive	posture.
Taken together, these tensions represent 
a	 shift	 in	 the	 US	 approach	 towards	 China,	
from	 one	 of	 deterring	 China’s	 aggressive	
posture	towards	reasserting	the	US	dominant	
power	status	in	the	Asia-Pacific.
Tensions 9 and 10 have been intentionally 
introduced	in	order	to	make	sure	that	Indian	
interests	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	 are	 not	 seen	 as	
peripheral and that India does have strategic 
stakes in what happens in the region.
The ten tensions represent the transition 




the	 establishment	of	 a	more	 stable	order	 in	
the	Asia-Pacific.	The	aim	was	to	underscore	
China’s rise, which is perceived as aggressive 
in	the	regional	neighbourhood	and	beyond.	
Responses of the Groups and Summary 
of their Behaviour: Based	on	the	ten	tensions,	
the	 groups	 were	 to	 respond	 and	 highlight	













	Ask	 India	 how	 far	 is	 it	 willing	 to	 go	
towards joint operations.





	Communicate	 with	 China	 to	 lower	
missile	readiness	state.
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	 Forward	deploy	nuclear-powered	attack	
submarine	 (SSN)	 Force	 to	 the	 coast	 of	
Mainland China.
Summary of the USA Behaviour: 
	 The	basic	intentions	which	emanate	from	
the	American	response	is	that	it	is	moving	
towards	 the	 containment	 of	 China	 at	
the given stage. This is followed by an 
American	 indication	 that	 they	 do	 not	
want	to	escalate	the	situation,	however,	
they	 are	willing	 to	 take	 that	 extra	 step	
in	case	China	antagonises	them.	The	US	
also	 effectively	 signals	 to	China	 that	 it	
[US]	 has	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	
Beijing’s	 Area	 Denial	 strategy.	 These	
signals	were	also	backed	up	by	actions	
such	 as	 forward	 deployment	 of	 SSN	
Forces	and	reinforcement	of	its	posture	
in	Japan.
	 Another	 trend	 in	 the	 US	 behaviour	 is	
to	 seek	more	 allies	 in	 the	 South	China	
Sea and the Indian Ocean region, in 
order to deter China. This is evident 
in	 the	 American	 action	 to	 approach	
India,	which	prefers	to	adopt	neutrality	
and	 remains	 relatively	 suspicious	 of	
American	 intentions.	 Undoubtedly,	
the	inclusion	of	New	Delhi	would	be	a	
game	 changer	 and	would	 also	 include	
the	Indian	Ocean	region	with	the	South	
China	 Sea.	 Interestingly,	 US	 actions	
point	to	its	intention	of	clubbing	the	East	
China	Sea,	South	China	Sea	and	Indian	
Ocean	 as	 one	 geographical	 domain,	
when dealing with China.
China’s Response
	 	Continuing	on	its	local	level	revisionist	
and	 global	 level	 status	 quo	 strategy,	
China	emphasises	the	need	to	abide	by	
past	important	treaties.
	As	 a	 response	 to	 the	 US	 pivot,	 China	
wants	 a	 new	 type	 of	 equal	 power	
relation	with	the	US.
	As	 an	 initiator	 of	 tensions	 in	 the	
South	China	Sea,	China	wants	 to	use	a	
combination	 of	 soft	 and	 hard	 policies.	
There	are	differences	in	the	way	it	deals	
with	 issues	 related	 to	 South	 China,	
as	 compared	 to	 the	 way	 it	 deals	 with	
problems	in	the	Sea	of	Japan.
	 In	 terms	of	Geography:	A	 combination	
of facilities and capacities in ports like 
Hambantota	 and	 Gwadar	 as	 well	 as	
along	the	African	Coastline	are	activated.	
 Caveat:	How	willing	and	accommodative	
would	 the	 host	 countries	 be?	 Why?	
(with	regard	to	the	specific	actions	that	
will	be	taken).	
	USA	 Air	 Sea	 Doctrine	 and	 US	 ABM	
batteries	 are	 seen	 as	 offensive	 actions,	
which are very provocative, and an 
appropriate	 response	 would	 be	 given.	
Draw	 red	 lines	 under	 possible	 US	
actions.	Space	based	capabilities	would	
be	employed.
	On	 the	 post	 Dalai	 Lama	 development,	
China	 wants	 to	 intensify	 measures	 on	
the	 security,	 religious,	 cultural	 and	
economic	 fields	 to	 cushion	 the	 impact	
of the passing away of His Holiness, the 
Dalai	Lama.
Summary of the Chinese Behaviour
	 China’s response to Event 1 avers that 
it	deals	with	regional	and	global	issues	
very	 differently.	 While	 it	 remains	
a revisionist power displaying a 
degree of assertiveness in the regional 
setting,	 it	 prefers	 to	 abide	 by	 essential	
global	 treaties.	 Therefore,	 it	 remains	
comfortable	 with	 the	 global	 status	
quo	 currently.	 Despite	 this,	 China	 is	
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also	 seeking	 to	 revise	 the	major	power	
relations,	 specifically	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
relations	with	the	US.	It	hopes	to	attain	




China	 perceives	 the	 problems	 in	 the	
South	China	Sea	as	being	distinct	to	the	
issues	in	the	East	China	Sea.	Beijing	does	
not	want	 to	 club	 the	 various	maritime	
issues	 together	 and	 prefers	 to	 handle	
each	differently,	based	on	the	countries	
involved	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 relations	 it	
has with each. This also highlights its 
practice	of	emphasising	bilateral	means	
of negotiation as opposed to adopting a 
multilateral	focus.	
	 When analysing the Chinese response, 
one	 could	 sense	 a	 degree	 of	 disconnect	
between	its	local/regional	strategy	and	its	
global	strategy.	This	is	substantiated	by	the	
absence of any strong signal sent by China 
during	Event	 1.	 Even	 though	 the	 group	
asserts	that	the	“US	Air	Sea	Doctrine	and	
US	ABM	 batteries	 are	 seen	 as	 offensive	
actions which are very provocative”, they 
fail to send any strong signal to deter any 
potential	 American	 action.	 Even	 with	





	ASEAN’s	 definition	 of	 ‘Revisionist	
China’	is	heightened	nationalism,	backed	
by	an	aggressive	military	posture.	
	Attempted	 unanimity	 among	 the	
ASEAN	member	countries.
	Given	 the	 differences	 between	
individual	 members,	 there	 will	 be	
an	 attempt	 to	 formulate	 a	 minimum	
strategy	 to	 face	 the	 situation	 without	
serious	confrontation	with	China.
	A	 unified	 policy	 to	 ensure	 continued	
presence	of	the	US	forces.











	An	 attempt	 would	 be	 made	 to	 put	 in	
place	joint	patrolling	by	ASEAN	Navies.
	Any	 substantive	 effort	 will	 require	
strong	US	involvement.
	 Initiatives	 to	diversify	ASEAN	trade	 to	
reduce	dependence	on	China.
	Limited	to	action	in	the	ASEAN	region:	
Both	 from	 the	 angle	 of	 security	 and	
foreign	 policy	 and	 given	 its	 limited	




Summary of the ASEAN Behaviour
	 The	ASEAN	 even	 though	 regarded	 as	
a	 single	entity	has	numerous	countries	
with	 varied	 individual	 aspirations	 and	
problems.	 This	 angle	 got	 reflected	 in	
ASEAN’s	response.	
	 ASEAN’S	 behaviour	 focussed	 on	
undertaking	 negotiations	 with	 various	
parties, especially in order to avoid 
escalation	 of	 the	China-Japan	 tensions.	
ASEAN	 expressed	 its	 keenness	 to	
include	 the	US	 in	 the	 region	 to	 further	
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its	security.	However,	it	is	important	to	
question	how	Chinese	allies	in	ASEAN	
such	 as	 Cambodia	 etc.	 would	 react	 to	
such	a	proposal.		
	 With regard to the stated tensions, the 






ensure	 operational	 preparedness	 and	
urgently	attend	to	the	gaps.
	Activate	diplomatic	channels.
Summary of the Indian Behaviour
	 India’s	 behaviour	 reflects	 restraint	
in light of the ten tensions. It also 
expresses	 its	 desire	 to	 engage	 with	
involved	 parties	 through	 diplomatic	
channels. This shows that India wants 
to	avoid	getting	involved	in	a	China-US	
confrontation for as long as possible. It 
contemplates	resorting	to	military	action	
only	 in	 the	case	when	 its	own	security	
is	 at	 risk.	 In	 terms	 of	 any	 signalling,	
New	Delhi	 shows	 readiness	 to	 commit	
capabilities	 but	 does	 not	 signal	 any	
strong	commitment.	
EVENT II & RESPONSES
Objective of the Event:	 To	 create	 a	
substantial	 crisis	 which	 forces	 China	 to	
change its approach and prevent the creation 
of	 a	 US-China	 dominated	 bipolar	 world	
order.	 Moving	 away	 from	 the	 baseline	
position	 of	 Event	 I—deterring	 China—to	
actual	containment.
Description of the Event: The	US	selectively	
abrogates the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the 
Potsdam	 Declaration	 of	 1945,	 and	 the	 San	
Francisco	 Treaty	 of	 1951,	 which	 unleashes	
Japanese	power	and	the	limitations	imposed	
on it by the treaties.
Responses of the Groups and Summary of 
their behaviour
USA	Response
	Decides to send its Secretary of State 
to	 Tokyo	 with	 instructions	 to	 expand	




	 Japanese	 forces	 need	 not	 take	
legislative	 permissions	 to	 operate	
worldwide.
	Approaches	 Vietnam	 to	 confer	 visiting	
facilities	 to	 US	 warships	 and,	 if	 possible,	
consider	passage	exercises	between	Vietnam	
Navy	and	Air	Force	with	US	warships.
	The	 US	 delegation	 is	 successful	 in	 its	




Summary of USA’s Behaviour
	 The	session	signals	the	strength	of	Japan-
US	relations	as	formal	allies.	Vietnam	is	
recognised	 as	 a	 crucial	 regional	 player	
and	 efforts	 are	 made	 to	 add	 it	 to	 the	
pro-US	 grouping	 in	 the	 region	 which	
consists	of	Japan	and	South	Korea.
China’s Response
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	 It will develop capacities and capabilities 





	Chinese	 efforts	 to	 upgrade	 its	 posture	
include	 enhanced	 intelligence,	
surveillance,	and	reconnaissance	(ISR).





	 Not	 allow	 any	 country	 to	 act	 as	 a	
regional	hegemon.
	 Put	 pressure	 on	 India	 to	 become	
sensitive to China’s strategic 
concerns.
	 Send	 a	 message	 to	 the	 US	 allies	
regarding	Chinese	 commitment	 to	
preserve its strategic space.
	The	Chinese	do	not	view	US’s	claims	of	
efficacy	 of	Air-Sea	 doctrine	 as	 credible	
and	 emphasise	 that	 action	 by	 the	 US	
to	 escalate	 tension	 will	 get	 befitting	
response.
Summary of China’s Behaviour
	 China,	which	 is	 in	 support	 of	 a	 status	
quo,	 is	 caught	 off	 guard	 by	 US’s	
declaration.	 Accordingly,	 it	 refuses	 to	
change	 its	 posture	 in	 the	 South	 China	
Sea	 and	 makes	 statements	 refusing	 to	
recognise	 the	 move,	 condemning	 US’s	
unilateral	 abrogation	 of	 treaties.	 It	
realises the need to enhance its regional 
clout.	Therefore,	it	embarks	on	a	mission	
to enhance bilateral cooperation with 
regional players. 
	 Faced	with	 an	 immediate	 threat,	China	
continues	 with	 additional	 deployment	
of	 its	 resources	 leading	 to	 an	 increase	
in	 its	 intelligence,	 surveillance	 and	
reconnaissance	 (ISR)	 activities.	 China	
recognizes	 India	 as	 a	 crucial	US	 ally	 in	
the	region	and	tries	to	check	its	moves	by	
concluding	military	and	political	alliances	
with	 its	 neighbours	 namely-	 Pakistan,	
Nepal,	Sri	Lanka,	and	Bangladesh.	
ASEAN	Response
	 In	 response	 to	 the	 developments,	
ASEAN	would	make	serious	diplomatic	
initiatives	 to	 restrain	 the	 US	 from	
going ahead with these internationally 
unacceptable	steps.	
	ASEAN	 can	 also	 not	 forget	 that	 they	
were	co-victims	with	China	of	Japanese	
aggression in World War II.
	ASEAN	 realises	 that the	 US	 actions	
would	 involve	 a	 major	 review	 of	
the	 structure	 of	 the	 UN	 Charter	 and	
International Law. 
Summary of ASEAN’s behaviour
	 ASEAN	adopts	the	conventional	course	
of	 indulging	 in	 vocal	 criticism	 of	 US’s	
actions	 without	 taking	 any	 affirmative	
action.	 It	undermines	 the	 legitimacy	of	
US’s	action	by	describing	it	as	a	violation	
of international law.  
	 As	 US	 and	 its	 regional	 ally	 Japan	 are	





	 India	 expressed	 its	 deep	 concern	 with	
the	developments	that	have	contributed	
to	 a	 serious	 deterioration	 of	 security	
situation	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	 and	 called	
upon	all	parties	to	exercise	restraint.
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	 India	 also	 stepped	 up	 its	 border	
vigilance	 and	 enhanced	 the	 security	of	
its vital installations.
Summary of the India’s behaviour  
	 Although	India	is	reasonably	concerned	
about	the	development	in	the	region,	it	
acknowledges that it does not directly 
impact	 India’s	 interests.	 Therefore,	 its	
response	to	the	crisis	is	limited	to	calling	
for	a	peaceful	resolution	of	the	dispute.
	 Simultaneously,	 in	 an	 environment	 of	
regional tension, India increases the 
vigilance of its border areas as steps to 
protect its territorial integrity.
EVENT III & RESPONSES
Objective of the event: To	 simulate	 an	
extreme	 case	 of	 aggressive	 China	 response	
that	forces	the	complete	change	from	baseline	
position	 to	 containment,	 thereby	 bypassing	
an	accommodative	postures.
Description of the event:	 China’s	
occupation	of	Quemoy	and	Matsu	islands.
Responses of the groups and summary of 
behaviour
USA	response
	A	 Congress	 resolution	 for	 China	 to	
withdraw	from	the	islands.
	Raising	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 UN	 Security	
Council.
	 Signalling intention to blockade the 
Straits of Malacca. 
	Attacking	 and	 destroying	 Chinese	
ELINT	satellites.
	Deploying	Multi	 Nation	 Task	 Force	 to	
Taiwan	Straits	as	a	demonstration	force.
	Raise	 alert	 level	 in	 Pacific	 Command	
and	deploy	for	Air-Sea	Battle.
	Asking	 for	 Chinese	 withdrawal	 from	
the islands.
Summary of USA Behaviour: 
	 The	US	response	 to	 the	event	 is	one	of	
aggression,	which	clearly	demonstrates	
the	 political	 and	 military	 commitment	
of	 the	 United	 States	 to	 preserve	 its	
interests in the region. 
	 The response also highlights the 
intention	 of	 the	 US	 to	 invoke	 a	multi-
national	response	to	China’s	occupation.
China’s	Response:	
	The Chinese response to the event 
included	 up	 gradation	 of	 military	
posture	 in	 its	 Southern	 and	 Eastern	
zones.
	 Increased	 surveillance	 in	 the	 South	
China Sea and the East China Sea.
	Putting	the	Second	Artillery	on	alert.
	Diplomatic	 endeavours	 including	 an	
emergency	 UNSC	 meeting	 to	 defuse	
tensions.




	A	 subtle	 message	 of	 financial	
implications	also	conveyed	to	the	US.	
Summary of China’s Behaviour: 
	 The Chinese response shows strong 
signals to defend its interests. 
	 The	 use	 of	 diplomacy	 to	make	 the	US	
seem	as	the	instigator	is	a	clear	move	by	
China.
	 China	maintains	 that	 it	 does	 not	want	
war nor did it initiate any actions against 
US	 assets.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 China’s	
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that	 ASEAN	 would	 issue	 a	 strong	
statement	that	condemns	China.	
	As	a	 further	point,	ASEAN	would	also	
support	 any	 UNSC	 resolution	 against	
China. 
Summary of ASEAN Behaviour: 
	 The	 ASEAN	 response	 to	 the	 event	





limited.	 ASEAN	 can	 only	 support	
international	resolutions	against	China.
Indian Response
	 India’s	 response	 included	 expressing	
deep concern over the events in the 
Asia-Pacific,	 which	 have	 pushed	 the	
security	situation	to	the	brink.
	 India	called	upon	all	parties	 to	express	
restraint in the region.
	At	the	same	time,	India	will	step	up	its	
border vigilance and protect its vital 
installations.
Summary of Indian Behaviour: 
	 The Indian response clearly 
demonstrates	 that	 it	 was	 concerned	
about	 the	 situations	 that	 arose	 in	 the	
Asia-Pacific,	 but	 will	 not	 take	 a	 clear	
posture,	as	it	is	not	on	India’s	turf.	
	 As	a	result	of	the	event	however,	India	
strengthens its border vigilance and this 
demonstrates	 India’s	 commitment	 to	
preserving its interests. 
EVENT IV & RESPONSES
Objective of the event:	 To	 simulate	 and	
bring in India as a proactive player in the 
exercise.
Description of the Event: The border 
actions	 in	 Northeast	 India	 were	 presented	
to	 the	 participants	 as	 a	 subset	 of	 China-
US	 dynamics,	 arising	 out	 of	 defending	 the	
Indian	interest.	Additionally,	the	Dalai	Lama	
factor	was	brought	in	to	make	the	inclusion	
of India relevant. Apart	 from	 this,	 CCS	
Directive—India’s	 Strategic	 Force	Posture—
was	also	included	to	indicate	that	New	Delhi	
would	 have	 to	 take	 a	 strong	 stand	 on	 the	
given	 situation	 and	 not	 remain	 indifferent/
neutral	 to	 the	 developments	 taking	 place.	
The	aim	was	to	highlight	China’s	rise,	which	
is perceived as aggressive in the regional 
neighbourhood	and	beyond.










Summary of USA Behaviour:
	 The	American	approach	to	India-China	
border actions display its disinterest, 
which	 emanates	 from	 its	 dominant	
power	 position	 and	 remains	 relatively	
suspicious	 of	 Chinese	 intentions	 –	
initially avoiding confrontation with 
China.	But	with	the	Indian	CCS	directive,	
the	 US	 invited	 India	 as	 a	 strategic	
partner	 knowing	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	
New	Delhi	would	be	a	game	changer.
China’s Response
	The	 Communist	 Party	 of	 China	 (CPC)	
looked	 at	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 factor	 in	
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detail. It was considered that the 
death	 of	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 may	 lead	 to	
enormous	 disturbances	 within	 India	
and	 hence,	 some	 repercussions	 can	 be	
felt	in	Tibet.	Self-immolation	by	monks	
in	 the	 Trans-Himalayan	 region	 and	
the	 Nepal	 factor	 were	 also	 taken	 into	
consideration. However, the CPC was 
largely	 optimistic	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	
post	Dalai	Lama	scenario.
Summary of China’s Behaviour
	 The	 CPC	 approach	 on	 border	 issue	
demonstrates	 Beijing’s	 confidence	 and	
dominance	in	the	region.	
	 After	 deliberations	 on	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	
factor,	 the	 CPC	 was	 optimistic	 about	
dealing	with	any	untoward	incidents	in	
Tibet or India. 
Indian Response
	The	 Chinese	 aggressive	 posture	 in	
India’s	 North-eastern	 sector	 and	 the	
South	China	Sea	were	discussed	by	the	
Indian	government	and	it	was	decided	to	
enhance the Indian position at the border 
in	 order	 to	 safeguard	 India’s	 territorial	
integrity and interest. CCS directive was 
issued	 in	 this	 regard,	 in	 order	 to	 alert	




Summary of China Behaviour
	 Indian	 approach	 demonstrates	 that	 it	
would	 restrain	 from	 any	 provocative	
measures,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	
would	formulate	policy	to	safeguard	its	
territorial integrity and interests. 
	 It	decides	to	enhance	surveillance	activity	
in border areas and to stabilise Tawang 
through	accelerated	development.
	 Asia-Pacific	 and	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	
issues	were	definite	concerns	to	India,	but	
considered	not	its	turf	by	the	policy	makers.




The Behaviour of the US & Allies 
Importantly,	 the	 simulation	 exercise	
reveals	 that	 the	 US	 was	 clearly	 interested	
in	maintaining	 its	 dominance	 in	 the	 region	
and	 to	 uphold	 the	 continuing	 primacy	 of	
US	 power.	 This	 US	 dominant	 position	 is	
reinforced	by	simultaneous	US	actions	in	the	
diplomatic,	military	 and	 economic	 spheres.	
Notably, the major strategic objective of the 
US appears to be to ensure that China does 
not rise to the level of an equal power. For 
instance,	 through	a	combination	of	political	
and	 military	 moves,	 Washington	 denies	
China’s	 claim	 on	 the	 9-dash	 line	 and	 also	
signals to China and its allies, that it intends 
to	 stand	 by	 its	 close	 regional	 allies	 such	 as	
Japan.	 It	 is	 also	 ready	 to	 respond	 if	 China	
wants to lower tensions. 
However, regardless of its willingness 
to	deter	Beijing	from	bullying,	there	is	also	a	
clear	intention	not	to	provoke	a	direct	military	
confrontation	 with	 China.	 For	 example,	
the	US	does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 very	 keen	 in	
engaging	with	 allies	 such	 as	 Philippines.	 It	
also	 stalls	 Japan’s	 request	 for	Washington’s	
direct	 intervention	 even	 though	 many	
littoral	 states	 would	 favour	 such	 a	 direct	
demonstration	of	US	power.	
This	 tactics	 of	 the	 US,	 however,	 raises	
some	key	issues,	such	as:
•	 Under	what	 circumstances	will	 the	US	





•	 While	 the	US	 clearly	 approaches	 Japan	
and reinforces its position in the East 







to	 deal	 with	 a	 possible	 Taiwan	 issue,	
arising	 out	 of	 the	 escalation	 dynamics,	
and that it takes a broader region based 
view	of	nation	state	politics?	The	broader	
question	to	ask	is	how	does	the	US	view	
its	 relations	 with	 the	 countries	 of	 the	
region	 in	 terms	 of	 relative	 importance	
and	its	priorities	in	the	region?
•	 What are the potential dangers that 





ally and not an independent entity, a 
weak	way	of	representing	the	reality?
•	 Will	 South	 Korea	 ally	 with	 Japan	 and	
the	 US	 against	 China?	 This	 may	 be	 a	
possibility	 under	 US	 duress,	 however	
such	an	arrangement	will	not	materialise	
without	its	share	of	challenges.
5. FINDINGS AND DISCuSSION
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•	 Does	 the	 US	 consider	 India	 an	 ally	 or	
neutral?	 If	 there	was	no	CCS	directive,	
would	 the	US	 actually	 approach	 India	






the	 US	 in	 the	 region.	 Inferences	 from	 the	
workshop proceedings show that China’s 
coercive	 strategies	 against	 its	 neighbours	
are	 tactical	 with	 an	 aim	 of	 signalling	 its	
supremacy.	 Evidently,	 China’s	 aggressive	
posture	 is	not	 aimed	against	 the	US.	China	
wishes	to	be	a	local	bully,	whereas	with	the	
US,	 it	 likes	 to	 keep	 at	 a	 level	 where	 there	
may	be	competitive	but	not	confrontational	
relations.	 In	 fact,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	
irrespective	of	their	posture	and	differences	
concerning	 the	 region,	 both	 the	 US	 and	
China	 want	 to	 avoid	 a	 conflict	 and	 solely	




China’s	 tactics	 differ,	 for	 instance,	 from	 the	
South	China	Sea	to	the	East	China	Sea.	Beijing	
seemed	 ready	 to	 escalate	 its	 aggressiveness	
in the East China Sea, whereas it wants to 
maintain	status	quo	in	the	South	China	Sea	
due	to	its	perceived	economic	benefits.
On India, Chinese signals indicate that it 
wanted	 to	 neutralise	 New	 Delhi,	 particularly	
deterring	 India	 from	 allying	 with	 the	 US.	 In	
short,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 in	 one	 region,	
Beijing	 wanted	 to	 ensure	 its	 dominance,	
whereas in the other region it wishes to avoid 
any	 conflict.	On	 the	whole,	China’s	 responses	
appear	to	be	ambivalent,	as	the	link	between	the	
local	strategy	and	global	actions	remain	unclear.
A	 comparison	 of	 Chinese	 regional	
strategies and its global strategy displays a 
degree of disconnect between the two. The 
absence	 of	 any	 strong	 signal	 from	 China	
during	Event	1	substantiates	this	conclusion.	
What	might	explain	this	behaviour	of	Beijing?
One possibility is that the Chinese 
yearning	 for	 controlling	 offshore	 natural	
resources	 in	 the	 region	 is	 the	 key	 driver	
of	 this	 behaviour.	 This	 disconnect	 could	
also	 be	 the	 result	 of	 differences	 between	
organisations	 and	 institutions	 within	 the	
Chinese	 government	 and	 the	Party.	A	 third	
possibility	 is	 that	China	may	be	adopting	a	
cautious	approach	towards	the	US	to	signal	






Nevertheless,	 Chinese	 signalling	 raises	
more	questions	than	answers,	such	as:
•	 What are the priorities of China’s strategic 
interests?	Is	there	a	contradiction	in	the	
Chinese	 behaviour,	 say	 between	 local,	
regional	and	global	levels?	
•	 Is	 there	 some	 kind	 of	 gap	 in	 China’s	
grand	 strategy	 because	 it	 continues	
to	 create	 problems	 in	 the	 South	China	
Sea and also hopes to resolve the 
issue?	 Is	 there	 a	 disconnect,	 because	
the	 conditions	 created	 by	 Beijing	 will	
only	 force	 the	 countries	 involved	 in	
the	dispute	 to	 look	 towards	 the	US	 for	
support?	 This	 may	 erode	 the	 support	
that	many	countries	in	the	region	might	
have otherwise given to China over 
Taiwan.	 If	 this	 seems	 logical,	 why	 is	
China	 adopting	 its	 current	 aggressive	
approach	in	the	seas	near	it?
•	 Does	 it	 make	 sense	 to	 link	 the	 South	
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China Sea, East China Sea and the 
Taiwan	 issue	 from	 a	 strategic	 point	 of	
view?	Does	China	have	a	clear	strategy	
to	 deal	 with	 these	 issues,	 keeping	 in	




actually	 support	 China?	 Does	 China	
think	that	 it	can	sustain	its	domination	
in	the	given	situation	and	win?	
•	 Will China respond or will it take a 
relatively	 low	 step	 against	 the	US	 and	
its	 allies?	 Under	 what	 conditions	 will	
China	act	against	the	US	and	its	allies?
•	 Is	 China	 realistic	 about	 its	 assessment	
of	 a	 third	 island	 chain?	 How	 would	
countries	that	are	a	part	of	China’s	third	
Island	chain	react	to	the	idea?	
•	 China	 makes	 political/military	 moves	
to	neutralise	India.	However,	it	is	worth	
debating if in the face of a crisis involving 
USA	 and	 Japan,	 will	 China	 invest	 so	
much	 time	 and	 effort	 in	 neutralising	
India?









unilateral	move	 to	abrogate	 laws	 like	Cairo	
Declaration	during	Event	II.	They	also	do	not	
like	the	Chinese	occupation	of	Quemoy	and	
Matsu	 in	 Event	 III.	As	 a	 disordered	 group,	
it	 prefers	 diplomacy	 i.e.	 negotiations	 with	
China	and	the	US.	Also,	many	of	the	ASEAN	
countries	 appear	 to	 be	 peripheral	 players	
except	for	those	aligned	directly	with	the	US.
The	 discussion	 within	 ASEAN	 and	 its	
response	raises	many	issues,	such	as:






Does	 looking	 at	 ASEAN	 as	 a	 unified	
group	make	political	or	military	sense?	
Can	ASEAN	ever	come	up	with	a	unified	
response to any event that involves a 
problem	between	China	and	the	US?
indian Behaviour
Remarkably,	 the	 simulation	 exercise	
demonstrated	 that	 though	India	considered	
the	 tensions	 and	 developments	 in	 the	
South	China	Sea	and	 the	East	China	Sea	as	
a concern, it chooses not to respond since it 
believes	that	this	region	is	not	its	turf.	Only	
with	 the	 Chinese	 actions	 at	 India’s	 North-
eastern	 border,	 does	New	Delhi	 display	 its	
concern	 and	 start	 sending	 out	 signals.	 The	
Indian	 posture	 shows	 a	 movement	 from	
restraint	 to	 readiness	 and	 eventually	 to	
talk	 about	 preparedness	 for	 waging	 war.	
Subsequently,	 with	 a	 CCS	 directive,	 New	
Delhi sends strong signals that it is prepared 
to	fight	if	pushed	further.
The analysis of the workshop 
proceedings	pose	few	key	issues,	these	are:
•	 Does India have valid interests in 
the	 South	 China	 Sea	 and	 under	 what	
circumstances	 will	 it	 become	 an	 issue	
compelling	 India	 to	 act?	 How	 would	
India have reacted had the CCS not been 
issued?
•	 Is India really not a part of the Chinese 
containment	 strategy?	 If	 not,	 why?	 If	
China	 had	 done	 what	 it	 did	 without	
23NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
ASIA-PAcIfIc Power DynAmIcS: StrAtegIc ImPlIcAtIonS AnD oPtIonS for InDIA
pushing	claims	in	the	maritime	domain,	
would	 it	 be	 acceptable	 for	 India	 and	
in	 this	 context,	 what	 would	 be	 India’s	
stand	on	the	Taiwan	issue?
•	 In	reality,	will	a	CCS	directive	be	issued	
in	 response	 to	 the	 ten	 tensions?	Under	
what	conditions	will	such	a	directive	be	
issued?
•	 Is	 there	 some	 logic	 to	 the	 Chinese	
aggressive	behaviour	or	does	 it	appear	
to	 be	 irrational	 to	 the	 Indian	 mind,	
which	 perhaps	 does	 not	 understand	
Chinese	thinking?
•	 How	can	we	relate	the	key	findings	from	
the	 workshop	 to	 realistic	 assumptions	
about	 Chinese	 strategic	 behaviour?	
How	 can	 we	 use	 this	 understanding	
to	 fine	 tune	 India’s	 relationship	 with	
China?
5.1 Future Work 
Since	 the	workshop	was	 the	first	 of	 its	










power	 that	 has	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	
regional	 power	 dynamics	 and	 needs	 to	 be	
treated as a separate player.
Since	 Japan	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	much	 of	
US	 strategy	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific,	 and	 is	 also	
a	 formidable	 economic	 power	 with	 high	
military	potential,	there	is	a	need	for	it	to	be	
modelled	as	a	separate	entity.
South	 Korea	 as	 a	 key	 US	 ally	 on	 one	
hand	 and	 a	 major	 friend	 of	 China	 on	 the	
other, also poses a special set of challenges. 
North	Korean	actions	are	a	cause	of	concern	
to	 two	 major	 powers	 of	 the	 region-	 Japan	
and	South	Korea.	Both	the	Koreas	may	need	
separate	treatment.
Australia	 is	 also	 emerging	 as	 a	 player,	
who is trying to enter the region as a key 
mediator	 and	 ally	 of	 the	US.	 It	 is	 trying	 to	
establish	 special	 relations	with	 some	of	 the	
key	countries	in	the	Asia-Pacific.
Though	ASEAN	does	 have	 an	 identity	
of	 sorts,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 to	 act	 cohesively	 in	
matters	relating	to	conflicts	and	crises.	Some	
of	 the	more	 important	members	of	ASEAN	






The workshop helped assess the 
changing	 dynamics	 of	 crisis	 escalation	 in	
the	 Asia-Pacific	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	





This	 crisis	 escalation	 exercise	 at	 NIAS	
also provided a wealth of insights into the 
complex	 interplay	 of	 various	 factors	 that	
influence	the	strategic	behaviour	of	countries.	
Future	 workshops	 could	 build	 upon	 these	
to	promote	much	needed	strategic	 thinking	
within the higher echelons of the Indian 
National	Security	System.
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